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A reconsiderationof the entirefederal questionfield would appear
necessary if the court is to clarify the presentjudicialdisorder.'
I. INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
Congress enacted a law vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the Southern

* Professor of Law, Georgia State College of Law. I would like to thank Bill Edmundson,
Steve Kaminshine, Neil Kinkopf, Suzanna Sherry, and Louise Weinberg for their helpful

comments.
1. Ray Forrester, The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Labor Disputes, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 114, 127 (1948).
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District of New York over all claims arising out of the airplane crashes.2
This new statute does not create any federal standards, defenses or
obligations and provides that the governing law will be the law of the place
where the crash occurred.3 Some of the lawsuits covered by the statute,
therefore, may be federal cases among nondiverse parties where state law
furnishes the rule of decision. The validity of federal jurisdiction over such
cases implicates one of the oldest and most difficult questions of
constitutional law.
Article III of the United States Constitution sets forth the classes of
cases to which the "Judicial Power" of the United States may extend.' The
only category which could even arguably support a case under the Air
Safety Act between nondiverse parties is the one allowing for federal
jurisdiction in cases "arising under... the Laws of the United States." 6 It
is far from obvious, however, how a case that is governed completely by
state tort law and raises no substantive federal issues or defenses can
"arise" under federal law for Article III purposes.7

2. AirTransportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L.No. 107-42, § 408(b)(3),
115 Stat. 230 (2001) [hereinafter Air Safety Act].
3. Id. § 408(b)(2). "The substantive law for decision in any such suit [under the act] shall
be derived from the law, including choice of law principles, of the State in which the crash
occurred unless such law is inconsistent with or preempted by Federal law." Id.
4. The Air Safety Act also creates an alternative voluntary compensation program whereby
those injured in airplane crashes can file claims with a federal master. See id. § 405. Legal issues
arising out of this part of the Air Safety Act are beyond the scope of this Article.
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 extends the federal judicial power to cases
in Law and Equity, arising under the Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made ... to all Cases affecting Ambassadors ...Ministers and
Counsuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to controversies
to which the United States [is] a party; to controversies between two or more
states [or] between a State and Citizens of another state; to controversies between
citizens of different States; [to controversies] between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States and to controversies between a
state or its citizens and a foreign state and its citizens.
Id.
6. Id.
7. See id. Although Congress has created a "federal claim" under the Air Safety Act, the
difficult Article III questions cannot be avoided by Congress transferring what is essentially a state
law claim to federal court and then incorporating state law wholesale. See In re TMI Litig. Cases
Consol. II, 940 F.2d 832, 864 (3d Cir. 1991) (Scirica, J., concurring) (stating that, "Mere
incorporation of state law cannot by itself satisfy Article III. If it could, every purely jurisdictional
grant would become constitutional if Congress simply added language declaring that state law
operates as federal law."); Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, The ProtectiveJurisdictionof the Federal
Courts, 30 UCLA L. REv. 542, 550 (1983) ("Claims in which the only federal law is an
incorporation of existing state law [should] be treated the same as claims based on state law alone
because the incorporation, by definition, would not alter any elements of the claim."). Although
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In the first significant judicial interpretation of Article III's "arising
under" language almost two hundred years ago, Chief Justice John Marshall
interpreted the phrase broadly to allow federal courts to exercise
jurisdiction over every case involving the Second National Bank, even
where state law furnished the rule of decision and the parties were not
diverse.8 Ever since then, Supreme Court Justices and constitutional law
scholars have debated the proper interpretation of Marshall's decision, as
well as the appropriate limits on Congress's power to grant "arising under"
jurisdiction to the federal courts.9 Although the Supreme Court has upheld
jurisdiction in nondiverse cases arising under state or foreign law,10 it has
never adequately justified its decisions, leading to creative efforts by
academics to fill that gap." Unfortunately, there has been more
disagreement than unity over a proper rationale for the Court's cases,
resulting in great uncertainty about the scope of Congress's Article III
powers.
Starting in 1948, and continuing to the present, constitutional
commentators have developed a theory called "protective jurisdiction," in
an effort to justify an interpretation of Article III that gives Congress broad

this Article concludes that the Air Safety Act is constitutional, it is not because Congress used the
magic phrase "federal claim" in what is essentially a pure jurisdictional statute. Rather, this
Article argues that pure jurisdictional statutes are constitutional if they are rationally related to
legitimate Article I concerns. See infra notes 96-107 and accompanying text.
8. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 824 (1824); see also
Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 905 (1824).
9. This is one of the few areas of constitutional law where Supreme Court Justices have
explicitly discussed and criticized the doctrinal suggestions of constitutional law scholars. See
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 462 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
10. See, e.g., PlantersBank, 22 U.S. at 905 (allowing a state law breach of contract suit in
a case involving the National Bank); Verlinden v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480 (1983)
(allowing a foreign corporation to sue a foreign country under nonfederal law in federal court);
Am. Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G. & A.E., 505 U.S. 247 (1992) (allowing state law claim against a
federally chartered corporation in federal court).
11. See, e.g., William R. Casto, The Federal Courts Protective JurisdictionOver Torts
Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467 (1986) (arguing that 28
U.S.C. § 1350 should be construed liberally); John Cross, CongressionalPowerto Extend Federal
Jurisdiction to Disputes Outside Article III: A Critical Analysis from the Perspective of

Bankruptcy, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1188 (1993) (discussing the Tidewaterjurisdictional problem and
bankruptcy); Thomas Galligan, Article XII andthe "Relatedto" BankruptcyJurisdiction:A Case
Study in Protective Jurisdiction,11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 54 (1987); Goldberg-Ambrose,
supranote 7; Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal 'Question'inthe DistrictCourts, 53 COLUM. L. REv.
157 (1953); Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform and Article III Jurisdiction, 59
FORDHAM L. REv. 169 (1990); Herbert Wechsler, FederalJurisdictionand the Revision ofthe
Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMp. PROBS. 216 (1948) (discussing whether the expansion of
federal court jurisdiction withstands Article III scrutiny); Louise Weinberg, The Power of
Congress Over Courtsin NonfederalCases, 1995 BYU L. REV. 731 (discussing the limits on the

national interest in federal jurisdiction).
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authority to provide for federal jurisdiction in nondiverse cases devoid of
federal law issues. 2 The core idea, though expressed in a variety of
different ways, is that Congress is allowed to "protect" legitimate Article
I concerns by granting jurisdiction to the federal courts even if the law
governing the case is nonfederal."3 Some scholars suggest that Congress
has this authority under Article I, while others argue Congress can
accomplish this goal by enacting a pure jurisdictional statute under Article
III.14 Either way, the theory of protective jurisdiction allows Congress to
further Article I interests by creating federal jurisdiction for nonfederal
cases. Although some of the Court's decisions seem to be explainable only
under a theory of protective jurisdiction, the Court has been reluctant to
explicitly accept the idea, 5 and has stated that pure jurisdictional statutes
do not meet Article III's requirements, thereby adding to the confusion. 6
The protective jurisdiction question has implications far beyond the
constitutionality of the Air Safety Act. For a myriad of important reasons,
Congress has attempted to give jurisdiction to the federal courts in
nondiverse cases where nonfederal law furnishes the rule of decision. For
example, Congress has wanted certain federal instrumentalities, such as the
American Red Cross, which are not technically considered to be part of the
government but are chartered thereby, to have access to federal courts (as
plaintiff or defendant) even where there is no federal issue in the case. 7
Congress has also vested jurisdiction in federal courts to hear bankruptcy
cases where the dispute is between nondiverse parties over state law breach
of contract and tort claims." And, Congress has provided a federal forum
to foreign countries as defendants even if the plaintiff's cause of action is
completely nonfederal and there is no diversity. 9

12. See, e.g., Galligan, supra note 11, at 54; Wechsler, supra note 11, at 224-25; Weinberg,
supra note 11, at 802.
13. See Wechsler, supra note 11, at 224-25.
14. Compare id. with Galligan, supra note 11, at 54.
15. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 491 n.17.
16. See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989) ("[P]ure jurisdictional statutes which
seek 'to do nothing more than grant jurisdiction over a particular class of cases' cannot support
Art. III 'arising under' jurisdiction.") (quoting Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 496).
17. See Am. Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G. & A.E., 505 U.S. 247, 257 (1992).
18. See Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367, 371 (1934).
19. See, e.g., Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 480. Numerous other federal laws raise similar Article
III issues. For example, the Alien Tort Claims Act provides that "[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for atort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2002). This statute, which appears
to be jurisdictional only, authorizes a suit between two aliens arising under the law of a foreign
country. See Casto, supra note 11, at 472. Without diversity or a federal question present, it is not
obvious how such a case can properly be brought in federal court. Another federal law which
raises difficult Article III questions is the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, which allows suits
in federal court against insurance companies which insure foreign diplomats and their families.
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The Supreme Court has been unable to set forth a coherent approach to
the validity of these statutes and other "arising under" questions partly
because of its concern for federalism. ° Arguably, the more power Congress
has to vest jurisdiction in the federal courts, especially over nondiverse,
nonfederal law cases, the less authority remains with the state courts.
Therefore, the Court has been reluctant to embrace any broad theory of
protective jurisdiction that would transcend one specific case and
significantly enlarge Congress's authority.2 ' Similarly, most commentators,
even those who support one ofthe many variants of protective jurisdiction,
are sensitive to federalism concerns and suggest some form of balancing
test between national goals and state interests.22
This Article provides a comprehensive analysis of Congress's authority
to give the federal courts jurisdiction over cases where the parties are not
diverse and federal law does not govern the controversy. Relying on the
traditional tools of constitutional interpretation (text, history, precedent,
and policy), I argue that if Congress has the political will to enact a statute
vesting jurisdiction in the federal courts and if that jurisdictional statute
furthers an enumerated power, then the law is constitutional without regard
to any balancing of federalism concerns and regardless of the diversity of
the parties or the source of law Congress chooses to govern the case. The
Court should interpret Article III, not as a limitation on Congress's Article
I powers, but as an authorization to implement those powers. This rule
would not only justify the validity of the Air Safety Act (a political

28 U.S.C. § 1364 (1981). The purpose of this law is to allow for the recovery of damages from
foreign diplomats who cause Americans injury, particularly in automobile accidents. See RICHARD
FALLON ET.AL, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 906-07
(4th ed. 1996). The idea is that, although the diplomats may have immunity, the insurance
companies do not. The legislative history of the law, however, makes it clear that state law
governs any lawsuits brought under the act. Id. Therefore, the statute provides for jurisdiction,
despite the absence of diversity, in a case to be decided under state law. In addition to these laws
that are actually on the books, Congress has proceeded cautiously with important pieces of
legislation because of doubts about the proper scope of Article III's "arising under" language. For
example, in 1969, Congress considered an important bill that would have allowed plaintiffs to
enforce state consumer protection laws in federal court. See Note, Federal
Jurisdiction-ProtectiveJurisdictionand Adoption as Alternative Techniques for Conferring
Jurisdiction on Federal Courts in Consumer Class Actions, 69 MICH. L. REv. 710 (1971)
[hereinafter Michigan Note]. Doubts about the constitutionality of the law were expressed at the
hearings, and the bill was never enacted. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supranote 7, at 565. For further
discussion, see infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
20. See Mesa, 489 U.S. at 136-37 (interpreting federal officer removal statute as applying
only when the defendant raises a federal defense to avoid serious federalism questions raised by
requiring state prosecutors to try traffic offenses against officers in federal courts).
21. See id. at 139.
22. See infra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
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inevitability), but all other federal laws granting jurisdiction to the federal
courts that are rationally related to legitimate Article I concerns.
The Supreme Court has, in practice, reached a conclusion similar to the
one offered here, but has refused to say so openly in its opinions. Although
the Court has been unwilling to give Congress significant authority to vest
jurisdiction in the federal courts by adopting a broad theory of protective
jurisdiction, the Court has approved specific grants of federal jurisdiction
over state and foreign law claims on a case-by-case basis.23 This
schizophrenia has confused lower courts and created great uncertainty
about the scope of the Court's decisions.24 This Article argues that the.
Court should make transparent its decisions and admit that Congress may
provide for federal jurisdiction under Article III whenever a federal law,
including a purelyjurisdictional one, furthers one ofCongress's enumerated
powers.
Although this interpretation of Article III appears at odds with the
Court's recent sensitivity to states' rights, allowing federal judges to
interpret state law in order to further national concerns is far less intrusive
than congressional preemption of state law or allowing federal judges to
create federal common law. Thus, allowing Congress broad authority to
vest jurisdiction in the federal courts is not only consistent with text,
history, and case law, but is the best way to insure a healthy relationship
between the state and federal governments.25
Part II discusses the relevant constitutional text and its history. Part III
summarizes how scholars have tried to make sense of the Court's cases,
describes the various theories of protective jurisdiction, and explores their
strengths and weaknesses. Part IV explains why federalism is best served
by an interpretation of Article III that gives Congress broad authority to
vest jurisdiction in the federal courts and uses the recently enacted Air
Safety Act to support this thesis.
23. See, e.g., Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 480 (allowing foreign corporation to sue a foreign
country under nonfederal law in federal court); Am. Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G. & A.E., 505 U.S.
247, 247 (1992) (allowing state law claim against a federally chartered corporation in federal
court).
24. See In Re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, 940 F.2d 832, 866 (3d Cir. 1991) (Scirica, J.,
concurring) (stating that "[p]rior case law does not dictate the applicable standards when Congress
has granted federal jurisdiction over cases in which the existence of federal questions is
speculative .... Osborn and erlinden... do not.., provide a complete framework for deciding
the precise issue confronting us.").
25. See infranotes 162-83 and accompanying text. A few other commentators have reached
similar conclusions as to the proper scope of Article III. See, e.g., Galligan, supra note 11;
Wechler, supra note 11; Weinberg, supra note 11. None of these commentators, however, wrote
prior to the Supreme Court's recent federalism revolution, which might explain why the articles
do not present comprehensive discussions of the effects of protective jurisdiction on state-federal
relationships. In addition, none of the scholars wrestled with the constitutionality of the Air Safety
Act, an obviously important piece of federal legislation.
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II. TEXT AND HISTORY
Article III allows Congress to grant the federal courts jurisdiction over
cases that arise under federal law.26 If Congress creates a substantive
federal right or defense, it is authorized by the Constitution to place the
enforcement of that right or defense in the federal system. The question this
Article is concerned with is whether Congress may create federal
jurisdiction for the enforcement of rights and defenses that arise under
nonfederal law. There are a number of reasons Congress may want to
establish federal jurisdiction over nonfederal obligations or defenses. First,
Congress may want to protect federal instrumentalities from state court
hostility." Second, Congress may want a certain set of obligations to be
litigated in a more uniform setting than the fifty state court systems.28
Third, Congress may believe that certain federal procedures, such as liberal
class action rules, may further national interests even though the law to be
applied in such cases is state law.29
To achieve any or all of these goals, Congress may pass a statute which
does nothing more than authorize federal jurisdiction over a certain class
of cases without creating any federal rights or obligations. There is no
constitutional difference between this approach and, as Congress did in the
Air Safety Act, creating a "federal claim" where there was once a state
claim and incorporating state law wholesale as the rule of decision. 0 Either
way, the only substantive issues in the case will be governed by state law.
The constitutional question is whether such a statute satisfies the "arising
under" language of Article III.
There is little helpful history on this question because the debates ofthe
constitutional convention do not reveal what the participants specifically
meant by the phrase "arising under." The limited evidence that exists,
however, suggests that there was strong agreement at the convention that
Article III was intended to allow for federal jurisdiction over all cases
involving the "national peace [and] harmony."' The idea was that matters
internal to one state would be beyond the reach of the federal judicial
power (other than diversity cases), but "where the Union is in some

26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
27. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); see also infra
notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
28. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 7, at 575.
29. Id. at 569.
30. See supra note 7.
31. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 7, at 586-87 (citing 3 J. ELLIOTr, DEBATES INTHE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

565 (2d ed.

1941)); THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 238 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)

(quoting Governor Randolph).
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measure concerned," federal jurisdiction would be appropriate.32 In fact, the
breadth ofjurisdiction over matters of national interest was so broad that
one objector to Article III argued that the "arising under" language was of
' The debates as a whole seem to indicate that
a "stupendous magnitude."33
Article III authorized Congress to extend federal jurisdiction to those cases
implicating Congress's enumerated powers.34
The text of Article III leads to the same conclusion. Federal question
jurisdiction requires that a case "arise under" a law of the United States.
There is no limitation in Article III on what kind of law that has to be or
whether it has to be based on substantive rather than procedural concerns.35
If Congress authorizes federal jurisdiction in a statute that furthers a
legitimate Article I interest, a case can arise under that law regardless of
which substantive law governs the controversy or whether that Article I
interest is related to the law governing the case. There is no constitutional
language, inside or outside Article III, indicating such ajurisdictional grant
is improper.
This interpretation of Article III is supported by numerous statements
by the framers that federal courts must be able to interpret any law
Congress has the power to enact. 36 Similarly, in a famous and off-quoted
passage from Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 37 Chief Justice John
Marshall stated that:
[T]he legislative, executive andjudicial powers, of every well
constructed government, are co-extensive with each
other .... The executive department may constitutionally
execute every law which the Legislature may constitutionally
make, and the judicial department may receive from the
Legislature the power of construing every such law ....
[Article III] enables the judicial department to receive
jurisdiction to the full extent of the constitution, laws, and
treaties of the United States .... 38

32. See 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 233 (Phillip Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds. 1987)
(quoting JAMES IREDELL, MARCUS, ANSWERS TO MR. MASON'S OBJECTIONS TO THE NEW

CONSTITUTION, Pamphlet No. 342-44 (1788)).
33. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 7, at 586 n.246 (citing 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 31,
at 565).
34. See Scott A. Rosenberg, Note, The Theory ofProtectiveJurisdiction,57 N.Y.U. L. REV.
933, 952 (1982). This excellent student Note has become a significant part of the scholarship on
issues of protectivejurisdiction, and like others before me, I will refer to it throughout this Article.
See, e.g., Galligan, supra note 11, at 2 n.3; Weinberg, supra note 11, at 809 n.250.
35. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
36. See Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 944 n.62 (citing numerous statements by the framers
supporting the idea that the judicial power had to correspond to the legislative power).
37. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
38. Id. at 818-19.
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These statements suggest that federal courts have the power to interpret
and enforce any law Congress may constitutionally pass.39 Sometimes,
Congress creates substantive rights and defenses, and the "arising under"
language is easily satisfied. But if Congress has a legitimate Article I
interest in vesting jurisdiction in the federal courts for procedural reasons,
such as making sure that foreign countries receive uniform treatment, then
the equivalence principle should also apply.4" In other words, there may be
a national interest in vesting jurisdiction in the federal courts even where
the law to be applied is nonfederal. 4 In such cases, the history ofArticle III
supports federal jurisdiction.
There is a plausible structural argument against an interpretation of
Article III that allows Congress to pass pure jurisdictional statutes that
further its Article I powers. If the "arising under" language reaches that far,
the other categories of jurisdiction listed in Article III would be
unnecessary and redundant because all of those classes of cases also
implicate the national interest and Congress's Article I powers. For
example, Congress could pass laws relating to "Ambassadors ...
Ministers
and Counsuls,"4 2 pursuant to its foreign affairs powers, and enact laws
relating to diversity cases pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Thus, the
argument goes, a reading of the "arising under" clause that permits
jurisdiction over any case implicating national concerns renders the
remainder of Article III superfluous and therefore cannot be correct.43
The argument that the Supreme Court should interpret the Constitution
in a way which forecloses overlapping sources of congressional authority,
however, cannot be reconciled with much of the case law of the twentieth
century. For example, even the current Supreme Court interprets the
Commerce Clause, supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause, as
allowing Congress to regulate most, if not all, economic activity.44 Thus,
under the Commerce Clause, Congress could create Post Offices, coin
money, and regulate bankruptcy, all of which it is authorized to do under
more specific Article I provisions.4" That Congress can point to different
and intersecting sources of power in Article I to justify various laws does
not mean that the Court is mistaken when it allows Congress to regulate
39. See id.
40. See Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 952 n.102.
41. See id.
42. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
43. See Galligan, supranote 11, at 58-59 (citing, Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 956).
44. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559, 566 (1995) (adopting a
commercial/noncommercial test to decide whether a particular local activity substantially affects
commerce so that Congress can regulate it); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613
(2000).
45. See Galligan, supra note 11, at 59.
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economic activity under the Commerce Clause. The framers simply could
not have anticipated how the powers given to Congress would be
interpreted over time and which ones would become the most useful. Just
as the Commerce Clause may swallow up other Article I powers, the
"arising under" language of Article III may do the same for other Article
III powers.
Furthermore, Congress's authority to vest jurisdiction in the federal
courts should remain parallel over time with Congress's powers under
Article I. It may be that the framers would be surprised by an interpretation
of Article III that gives Congress the power to place many cases in federal
court that traditionally would have been tried in state court. But they also
could not have anticipated the growth of federal power under Article I. The
equivalence principle discussed above was well accepted by the framers and
makes sense. Congress's authority to vest jurisdiction in the federal courts
must "wag the tail" of its Article I powers in order for the government to
operate efficiently.46 As long as Congress's desire to create federal
jurisdiction is supported by an enumerated power, "arising under"
jurisdiction in such cases is consistent with the text and history of Article
III regardless of whether the law providing for jurisdiction is supported by
substantive or procedural concerns.47
III. JUDICIAL AND SCHOLARLY THEORIES OF "ARISING UNDER"
JURISDICTION

A. Osborn v. Bank of the United States
The focal point of any discussion of Congress's power to create "arising
under"jurisdiction must be Osbornand the academic commentary spawned
by the case. Much of the current uncertainty about federal question
jurisdiction can be traced to Justice Marshall's opinion.
In Osborn, the Bank ofthe United States sought an injunction in federal
court to avoid paying taxes to the State of Ohio. 48 After finding that
Congress intended the Federal Bank to be able to sue and be sued in federal
court, Marshall considered whether the suit could constitutionally arise
under federal law for purposes of Article II1. 4' Although the answer in this

46. See Osbom v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 818-19 (1824); see
also supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing Osborn).
47. See Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 948 ("Congress might find that federal jurisdiction
itself is necessary for the effectuation of an Article I interest regardless of the rules of decision
imposed. In such instances, federal jurisdiction itselfmay be necessary and proper without respect
to the existence of federal rules of decision.").
48. See Osborn, 22 U.S. at 816.
49. Id. at 819; see also MARTIN REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE
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particular case was easy, the Bank's defense was that federal law
preempted state law and this was a federal issue, Justice Marshall's
explanation for finding jurisdiction created much confusion."
Marshall first argued that the presence of any federal issue in 4 case
provides the Court withjurisdiction to resolve all the questions raised, even
nonfederal ones." This statement of supplemental jurisdiction has not
proven controversial. Marshall then posed a hypothetical case, similar to a
real one the Court decided the same day. 2 He asked whether a state law
breach of contract action brought by the bank would arise under federal
law. 3 He answered the question in the affirmative by arguing that the
Bank's right to sue under the relevant federal statute, which would always
be the first issue in the case, was a federal question, and therefore
jurisdiction would be proper in each and every case involving the Bank.5 4
He went on to say that even if the Bank's statutory right to sue had been
conclusively decided in a previous case, and the question was no longer
being litigated, there would still be federal jurisdiction because the
"question forms an original ingredient in every cause." 5 Professor Redish
has suggested that this explanation means that in any case where a federal
issue could possibly be raised, regardless of whether it is actually raised,
and regardless of whether the issue had been conclusively determined
before, federal jurisdiction would be consistent with Article 111.56
Commentators have had a difficult time with Marshall's explanation in
Osborn because his reasoning would allow just about any case in federal
court." There is always the possibility that a litigant may raise a
constitutional or federal'preemption issue about the plaintiff s right to sue
or the defendant's right to defend a state law case. That possibility alone,
according to Marshall, would satisfy Article III, even if the case, in the end,
raised no federal question. Because of this difficulty, constitutional law
scholars have devoted considerable energy to rehabilitating Osbornto make
its reasoning more palatable.

ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER

84 (2d ed. 1990) (citing Osborn, 22 U.S. at 817-18). Much of

the following description of Osborn comes from Professor Redish's fine discussion. See id.

50. See id.
51. Id. at 84-85 (citing Osborn, 22 U.S. at 823).
52. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 823 (discussing United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 904 (1824)).
53. Id. at 823-24.
54. REDISH, supra note 49, at 85 (citing Osborn, 22 U.S. at 822).
55. Id. at 85 (quoting Osborn, 22 U.S. at 824).

56. See id.
57. See Weinberg, supra note 11, at 782.
58. REDISH, supra note 49, at 85.
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The first and most obvious way to limit Osborn is to suggest that its
rationale applies only to federal instrumentalities.5 9 As Justice Marshall
argued in McCulloch v. Maryland," Congress's power to create federal
entities includes the authority to protect them against hostile state courts.6'
Thus, Congress should be allowed to provide a federal forum for all suits
threatening such entities.62 The Supreme Court recently affirmed this view
in American National Red Cross v. S.G. & A.E.,63 where it allowed the
American Red Cross to remove a state law tort action to federal court.'
The Court said that Article III is "broad enough to authorize Congress to
confer federal court jurisdiction over actions involving federally chartered
corporations,"65 and there was "no reason to contemplate overruling"
Osborn.66

This approach to the problem accepts the theory of protective
jurisdiction for federal entities because the statutes at issue in Red Cross
and Osborn were purely jurisdictional. Under Article I, Congress could
probably have federalized the law governing such cases, but it did not
choose that path. The suit against the Red Cross was governed by state tort
law, and Marshall hypothesized a state court suit in Osborn. How could
such cases "arise under" federal law for Article III purposes if not under a
theory of protective jurisdiction? One possible answer, given by Justice
Marshall in Osborn, is the issue of the plantiffs right to sue, which is a
federal question, is sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the entire case.67
But then the mere possibility of an issue being raised, even if it has already
been decided by the Supreme Court, is enough to confer jurisdiction over
every other case brought by or against that entity. Even if that rationale is
limited to federal instrumentalities, it seems unpersuasive and overbroad.6

59. See Weinberg, supra note II, at 782.
60. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
61. Id. at 403-05.
62. See id.
63. 505 U.S. 247 (1992).
64. See id. at 264.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 265.
67. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738, 823-24 (1824).
68. At one time, the Court extended the Osbornholding to federally chartered railroad stock
companies. See Pac. R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885) (ruling that cases brought against
railroad companies in state court could be removed to federal court). Subsequently, Congress
enacted a law requiring that the United States own at least half the stock in a federally chartered
corporation before the corporation can sue and be sued in federal district court. See 28 U.S.C. §
1349 (2002). This federal law caused confusion in the lower courts as to whether it applied to
federally chartered companies that do not have stockholders. See Weinberg, supranote 11, at 799
n.228. The Supreme Court reached the conclusion in Red Cross that, at least as to that specific
corporation, 28 U.S.C. § 1349 did not deprive the district courts ofjurisdiction. See Am. Nat'l Red
Cross v. S.G. & A.E., 505 U.S. 247, 264-65 (1992). The statutory interpretation issues
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A better explanation for Osborn andRed Crossis that Congress has the
power to "protect" legitimate Article I interests, including shielding federal
entities from state court hostility.69 In 1824, the Bank of the United States
might not have received fair treatment in state courts. 70 Therefore,
Congress had the authority to preserve and maintain the Bank's status by
requiring all suits against it to be brought in federal court.
This argument, which was not relied upon by Justice Marshall, does not
depend on the notion that the lawsuit against the Bank "arises under" a
federal law that creates substantive rights and obligations. Rather, the
argument assumes that Congress has the power to protect important federal
interests through purely jurisdictional laws. Approximately fifty years ago,
several law professors began exploring this theory and argued that
Congress has authority to confer federal jurisdiction to protect Article I
concerns; such as preserving federally chartered corporations, or giving
unions the right to enforce collective bargaining agreements, even if the
cases were to be decided under state law.7' Their arguments on behalf of
protective jurisdiction were at least as persuasive as Justice Marshall's
rationale in Osborn that even the remotest possibility of a federal issue
coming into a casejustified arising underjurisdiction. 72 The Supreme Court
first confronted these arguments in two important cases decided shortly
after the first law review article appeared.
B. Tidewater
The first case to trigger a debate among the Justices over protective
jurisdiction was National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer
Co.73 In Tidewater, the Court considered a statute authorizing diversity
jurisdiction over cases involving citizens of the District of Columbia.74 The
problem was that a nineteenth century Supreme Court decision had
established that citizens of the District of Columbia were not citizens of a
"state" for purposes ofArticle III diversity jurisdiction.75 Only two Justices
in Tidewater voted to overturn that ruling.76 There were three votes,
however, for the proposition that Congress could create diversity

surrounding 28 U.S.C. § 1349 are beyond the scope of this Article.
69. See Mishkin, supra note 11, at 188.
70. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,481 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (stating "Marshall's holding was undoubtedly influenced by his fear that the bank
might suffer hostile treatment in the state courts .... ).
71. See Forrester, supra note 1; Mishkin, supra note 11; Wechsler, supra note 11.
72. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
73. 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
74. Id. at 599.
75. See Hepburn & Dundas v. ElIzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445, 452 (1805).
76. Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 604 (Rutledge & Murphy, JJ., concurring).
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jurisdiction for D.C. citizens pursuant to Congress's Article I authority to
regulate the District of Columbia." Thus, there were five votes to uphold
the law allowing citizens ofthe District of Columbia access to federal court
in diversity cases.
Justice Jackson, who wrote the plurality opinion, did not argue that the
case arose under the jurisdictional statute. Instead, he suggested that
Congress is not limited to the specific categories of cases listed in Article
III, but also could create federal jurisdiction as a necessary and proper way
to implement an Article I power." This argument, locating Congress's
power in Article I instead of Article III, was criticized by the six other
Justices.79 They relied on both history and policy for the proposition that
Article III sets forth the exclusive category of cases to which the "Judicial
Power" extends.8" Furthermore, the dissenting Justices argued that if
Congress may go beyond the boundaries listed in Article III, there was no
reason it could not also ignore the "case and controversy" requirements of
that provision. Justice Frankfurter said, "if the precise enumeration of
cases as to which Article III authorized Congress to grant jurisdiction to
[Article III courts] does not preclude Congress from vesting these courts
with authority which Article III disallows, by what rule of reason is
Congress to be precluded from bringing to its aid the advisory opinions of
this Court."82 Similarly, Justice Rutledge argued that if "Article III were no
longer to serve as the criterion of district court jurisdiction, I should be at
a loss to understand what tasks within the constitutional competence of
Congress, might not be assigned to district courts." 3 In other words, if
Congress could give federal courts jurisdiction over cases not listed in
Article III, there was nothing to prevent Congress from giving federal
courts jurisdiction over disputes which were not "cases" or
"controversies."84 But the "case or controversy" limitation on federal
judicial power is an essential component of our system of separation of
powers and distinguishes the work of the judicial branch from the other
87
branches.8 5 For this reason, Justices Frankfurter86 and Rutledge
persuasively argued that Article I cannot be used as a separate and

77. Id. at 600.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 646 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 648 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also REDISH, supra note 49, at 24 (citing Justice
Frankfurter's dissent).
83. See Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 616 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
84. See REDISH, supra note 49, at 24.
85. See id.
86. See Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 646 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
87. Id. at 616 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol54/iss3/1

14

Segall: Article III as a Grant of Power: Protective Jurisdiction, Federal
ARTICLE IIASA GRANT OF POWER

independent source of Congressional authority to confer federal jurisdiction
on Article III courts.88
C. Lincoln Mills
A different theory of protective jurisdiction, that Congress can create
federal jurisdiction pursuant to pure jurisdictional statutes enacted under
Article III, was criticized by Justice Frankfurter in his famous dissent in
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills.89 The majority in Lincoln Mills
interpreted Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act as a grant to the federal
courts to create federal common law to govern disputes between unions
and employers over collective bargaining agreements. 9' Justice Frankfurter
disagreed with that conclusion and therefore had to consider whether
Congress could give federal courts jurisdiction over state law claims
brought by unions and employers under the federal labor laws.9 As part of
that evaluation, he reviewed and criticized the protective jurisdiction
arguments9 that
had been advanced by Professors Paul Mishkin and Herbert
2
Wechsler.
Frankfurter began by describing the theory of protective jurisdiction as
follows:
Called "protective jurisdiction," the suggestion is that in any
case for which Congress has the constitutional power to
prescribe federal rules of decision and thus confer "true"
federal question jurisdiction, it may, without so doing, enact
ajurisdictional statute, which will provide a federal forum for
the application of state statute and decisional law. Analysis of
[this] theory might also be attempted in terms of the language
of Article III--construing "laws" to include jurisdictional
statutes where Congress could have legislated substantively in
a field. This is but another way of saying that because
Congress could have legislated substantively and thereby
could give rise to litigation under a statute of the United
States, it can provide a federal forum for state-created rights
although it chose not to adopt state law as federal law or to
originate federal rights.93

88. This does not mean, however, that Congress cannot use a pure jurisdictional statute
pursuant to its Article III authority to further an Article I interest. See infra notes 104-07 and
accompanying text.
89. 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 456.
91. Id. at 473 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 473-74 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see Mishkin, supra note 11; Wechsler, supra
note 11.
93. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 473-74 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Professor Wechsler
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Justice Frankfurter criticized this argument on the basis that the
"restrictions" of Article III "are not met or respected by a beguiling phrase
that the greater power here must necessarily include the lesser."94 To the
extent that Mishkin and Wechsler supported their theory of protective
jurisdiction on the basis that Congress's power under Article I to preempt
state law includes the "lesser" power to create federal jurisdiction,
Frankfurter's critique has merit. It does not necessarily follow that the
power to create federal jurisdiction is a power included within all of
Congress's Article I powers, just as it does not necessarily follow that
because states have the "greater" power to outlaw certain activities such as
drinking alcoholic beverages, they also have the "lesser" power to outlaw
all speech concerning that activity.95
Where Justice Frankfurter erred, however, was in concluding that the
"arising under" clause of Article III is a "restriction" on Congress which
limits its power to create federal jurisdiction to those cases governed by
substantive federal law. The framers gave Congress the power to create
lower federal courts in Article I,96 and the jurisdiction of those courts is
defined in Article III." A case can "arise under" federal law, for Article III
purposes, when Congress uses federal jurisdiction to further legitimate
Article I interests, which may or may not be related to the substantive law
governing cases under the jurisdictional statute. In other words, the power
to enact pure jurisdictional statutes derives from authority given to
Congress in both Articles I and III. Viewed this way, the protective
jurisdiction argument not only makes sense of the case law, but is the best
reading of the text, history, and structure of the Constitution. Before that
argument can be fully developed, however, Justice Frankfurter's other
arguments in Lincoln Mills must be addressed.

would have allowed protective jurisdiction in all cases where Congress had Article I authority,
regardless of whether or not that authority had actually been implemented. See Wechsler, supra
note 11, at 224-25. Professor Mishkin, on the other hand, would have limited the use of protective
jurisdiction to those situations where Congress had already entered a field and actually exercised
its Article I powers. See Mishkin, supra note 11, at 189-90. This Article advances a theory similar
in result to Professor Weschler's, though for different reasons. See infra notes 104-07 and
accompanying text.
94. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 474.
95. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,510 (1996) (rejecting the State's
argument that it may ban liquor price advertising because it may ban the sale of alcoholic
beverages outright; "[This] 'greater-includes-the-lesser' reasoning. .. is inconsistent with both
logic and well-settled doctrine.").
96. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8 (Congress has the power "to constitute Tribunals inferior to the
supreme Court.").
97. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cI. 1.
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Justice Frankfurter also criticized Wechsler's theory on the basis that,
to the extent protectivejurisdiction is supposed to safeguard certain entities
or parties from hostile state courts, the diversity clause of Article III
"exhausted" Congress's legitimate concerns in this area.9" In other words,
to the extent the purpose of a federal law is to "insure impartiality to some
litigant,"99 that objective is inconsistent with Article III's recognition of
protective jurisdiction only in the "specified situation of diverse
citizenship.' ' °
The problem with this argument is that there is no historical evidence,
nor is there any structural reason to assume, that the diversity clause strips
Congress ofthe power to create federal jurisdiction in nondiverse situations
where there is a federal interest in providing a federal forum to favored
entities or parties.' 0 ' The purpose of the diversity clause, like the rest of
Article III, was to insure that the judicial power would extend to all cases
involving the "national peace or harmony."10" Providing a federal forum
when citizens of different states sue each other certainly meets that
standard, but so does providing a federal forum for labor unions when
Congress has reason to believe that they will not receive fair treatment in
state courts and that disparate treatment creates a national economic
problem. Ajurisdictional provision allowing unions access to federal court
may further legitimate Article I concerns just as much as traditional
diversity jurisdiction. Both the diversity and "arising under" parts ofArticle
III grant Congress authority to create federal jurisdiction when the national
interest so requires, and there is no basis for reading one as a limitation on
the other.0 3
A hypothetical statute involving class actionproducts liability suits will
demonstrate this point. Assume that some states have antiquated class
action procedures that make it virtually impossible to bring class actions
against multistate corporations that distribute dangerous products across
state lines. Congress studies the problem and determines that the national
economic interest will be served if consumers can coerce larger companies
to make safer products by bringing class action lawsuits. Congress could
federalize products liability law under the Commerce Clause or instruct the

98. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 473-75 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

99. Id. at 476 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
100. Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
101. Of course, there are other reasons why Congress may enact pure jurisdictional statutes
such as to achieve uniformity of procedures or to provide a necessary federal procedural device.
See infranotes 104-07 and accompanying text.
102. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 7, at 587; see also supra notes 32-34 and
accompanying text.
103. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 7, at 587-88; see also Weinberg, supra note 11, at
804-05 (arguing that Congress has authority under the "arising under" clause to enact "partyprotective" statutes despite the argument that the diversity clause undercuts that power).
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federal courts to make federal common law. In both ofthese circumstances,
assuming a reading of the Commerce Clause at least as broad as the current
14
majority's adoption of the commercial/non-commercial distinction, 1
federal jurisdiction would be proper under the "arising under" language of
Article III. But Congress may decide that it wants state substantive law to
apply either out of federalism concerns or because Congress wants different
state laws to apply to different geographical areas. Despite those legitimate
goals, Congress might still have a strong interest in federal court
jurisdiction over these cases because of the utility of uniform and efficient
05
class action procedures and pass a jurisdictional statute to that effect.1
That law, though jurisdictional only, is consistent with an enumerated
power, the Commerce Clause. Why, therefore, should such a law not be
one under which a case can "arise?" Reading Article III as a grant of
power, rather than a limitation on power, simply gives Congress one option
other than total preemption of state law to further legitimate national goals.
Similar arguments may be made on behalf of the Air Safety Act. For
security and efficiency reasons, Congress wanted all of the claims arising
out of the terrorist incidents to be litigated in a single forum.0 6 Numerous
Article I provisions, including the War Power and the Commerce Power,
probably justify this congressional action."' The Air Safety Act is an
important law that seeks to promote important national interests by insuring
a federal forum over what are essentially state law claims. Neither the
importance nor the constitutionality of the Act is diminished because the
governing law happens to be nonfederal.
A major obstacle to this interpretation of Article III is that the Supreme
Court has suggested that federal cases cannot arise under pure jurisdictional
statutes. The Court has made this statement in several recent cases so it is
necessary to discuss those decisions in detail.

104. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-13 (2000).
105. This hypothetical is based on several laws that were actually proposed in Congress
during the late 1960s. For a full discussion, see Michigan Note, supra note 19 (examining the
constitutionality of various theories of protective jurisdiction under Congressional authority
granted by Article I of the Constitution).
106. For a more specific discussion of the reasons Congress may have wanted to vest
jurisdiction in the federal courts over all claims arising out of the airplane crashes, see infra notes
187-88 and accompanying text.
107. If one believes that there are no legitimate national interests supporting the Air Safety
Act, then it would be unconstitutional because it is not rationally related to an Article I power, not
because the law is purely jurisdictional and creates no new federal standards or obligations.
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D. The Modern Arising Under Cases
In Mesa v. California,°8 the Court had to decide whether the federal
officer removal statute allowed two federal employees to remove state
court traffic prosecutions from state to federal court. 109 The removal statute
allows any federal officer or "person acting under that officer," to remove
"[a] civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court... for
any Act under color of such office ... ."" As a statutory interpretation
matter, the Court held that the federal employees had to assert a federal
defense to gain removal otherwise the case would have raised "serious
doubt whether, in enacting [the removal statute], Congress would not have
expanded the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the bounds
established by the Constitution."'" The Court supported this statement by
suggesting that the removal provision "is a pure jurisdictional statute,
seeking to do nothing more than grant district court jurisdiction over cases
in which a federal officer is a defendant. Section 1442(a), therefore, cannot
independently support Art. III 'arising under' jurisdiction.""' 2
There are numerous reasons why this statement from Mesa should not
be taken to foreclose the constitutionality of pure jurisdictional statutes.
First, it is dictabecause the Court held that Congress did not intend Section
1442 to provide for federaljurisdiction absent a federal defense." 3 Second,
the only case cited by the Court for its statement was Verlinden v. Central
Bank ofNigeria,l4 which never held that pure jurisdictional statutes do not
satisfy Article III, but merely restated the Court of Appeals decision in that
case which the Court reversed. 5 Third, the Court has in fact upheld other
federal statutes that do nothing more than grant jurisdiction to the federal
courts. A brief review of these cases demonstrates that the Court, despite
its dicta in Mesa, has in fact, and for good reason, affirmed "arising under"
jurisdiction in cases involving pure jurisdictional statutes.
In Verlinden, a Nigerian company refused to take delivery of cement
ordered by one of its agents from a Dutch company." 6 The lawsuit was
allegedly authorized by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)." 7

108. 489 U.S. 121 (1989).
109. Id. at 123.
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (2001).
111. Mesa, 489 U.S. at 136 (quoting Verlinden v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 494
(1983)) (quotation marks omitted).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 139.
114. 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
115. Id. at 495-96; see also Mullenix, supranote 11, at 202.
116. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 483. For an excellent discussion of the facts, see Weinberg,
supra note 11, at 784.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (2002).
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This statute abrogates sovereign immunity for foreign countries under
certain circumstances such as when the defendant is engaged in commercial
activities or the sovereign has waived its immunity." 8 The Act creates
concurrent jurisdiction in state and federal courts, but also contains a
provision allowing for removal of all claims authorized by the law." 9 The
FSIA explicitly states that the liability of a foreign sovereign under the Act
is to be determined under the law that would be applied if the defendant
were a private individual and, with limited exceptions, "under the law ofthe
place where the action or omission occurred."' 0 Thus, the FSIA vests
jurisdiction in the federal courts to hear disputes between nondiverse
parties under state law or even the law of a foreign country. The issue in
Verlinden was whether this grant ofjurisdiction was consistent with Article
1.121

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the section ofthe
FSIA that authorized jurisdiction went beyond the permissible boundaries
22
of Article III because it did not create substantive rights or liabilities.
According to the Court of Appeals, Congress cannot,
by the mere act of passing a statute conferring jurisdiction
over a class of suits.., bring those suits within the judicial
power. The reason is clear: to allow Congress to do so places
no limits on the judicial power at all, and a sina qua non 2of3
constitutional analysis instructs that this power is limited.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals on the grounds that
through the FSIA, Congress did more than simply grant jurisdiction to the
federal courts, Congress also "exercised its power to regulate foreign
commerce, along with other specified Art. I powers.' 2 4 According to the
Court, the FSIA "does not merely concern access to the federal courts,"
but instead "codifies the standards governing foreign sovereign immunity
as an aspect of substantive federal law.'0 25 Because in every case the court
will have to determine that one of the exceptions to sovereign immunity
exists, "every [lawsuit] against a foreign sovereign necessarily involves
application of a body26of substantive federal law, and accordingly 'arises
under' federal law.'

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. § 1605(a)l-(a)2.
Id. § 1441(d).
Id. § 1606; see also Weinberg, supra note 11, at 747-48.
See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 480.
See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 647 F.2d 320 (2d. Cir. 1981).
Id. at 328.
Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 496.
Id. at 496-97.
Id. at 497.
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The Supreme Court's analysis of the "arising under" question in
Verlinden is incomplete and unpersuasive. In Verlinden, the only
connection between the lawsuit and the United States was the presence of
a letter of credit deposited by the Nigerian company in aNew York bank. 27
The lawsuit was to be decided under either Dutch or Nigerian law. 28 There
was nothing federal about the lawsuit other than the question whether the
Nigerian company could assert sovereign immunity. The FSIA, however,
29
clearly denotes this question as jurisdictional, not substantive.
Furthermore, the FSIA creates no substantive federal law, and the
legislative history shows that is exactly what Congress intended.13 °
Despite the Court's short argument to the contrary, the sovereign
immunity provisions of the FSIA are simply a gateway to jurisdiction. If,
for example, the Nigerian company had explicitly and knowingly waived its
sovereign immunity in its contract with the Dutch company so that any brief
asserting sovereign immunity would not pass Rule 11, the case, under the
Court's reasoning, could still be filed in federal court even though there
would never be an issue of federal law in the case and the parties were not
diverse. In that circumstance, there would be only two possible rationales
for the exercise of federal jurisdiction. One would be Justice Marshall's
theory in Osbornthat the mere possibility of a federal question, no matter
how remote, and regardless of whether it had been conclusively decided
previously by the court, can satisfy Article III.31 This theory, however,
would lead to the exercise of federal jurisdiction in almost every case.
Second, and far more persuasive, Congress has the power to create a pure
jurisdictional statute to further legitimate Article I concerns. The FSIA, of
course, easily satisfies that test. As the Court itself recognized,
Congress has the undisputed power to decide, as a matter of
federal law, whether and under what circumstances foreign
nations should be amenable. to suit in the United States.
Actions against foreign sovereigns in our courts raise sensitive
issues concerning the foreign relations of the United
States,
32
and the primacy of federal concerns is evident.'
These "federal concerns" are legitimate irrespective ofwhether the rule
of decision in the case is state, federal, or even the law of a foreign country.

127. See Weinberg, supra note 11, at 784.
128. Id. at 784-85.
129. See George Brown, BeyondPennhurst-ProtectiveJurisdictio,The EleventhAmendment,
and The Power of Congress to EnlargeFederalJurisdictionin Response to the Burger Court,71

VA. L. REv. 343,374 n.194 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982)).
130. See Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 1013.
13 1. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
132. Verlinden v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983).
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Congress could, of course, create substantive law to govern these cases
under the foreign commerce clause, but there is no reason why Congress
should have to take that step if the FSIA's jurisdictional provisions are
supported by rational Article I concerns. Here, the desire to provide
uniform procedures for foreign sovereigns sued in our courts easily satisfies
that standard.
An ironic aspect of Verlinden is that even though the case has been
cited for the proposition that "arising under" jurisdiction cannot be
grounded in a pure jurisdictional statute133 and for the rejection of
protectivejurisdiction, 3 4 those are the only persuasivejustifications for the
result in the case. As one commentator has observed, "the Supreme Court
seems to be saying 'do what I do, not what I say."' 135 It is time for the
Court to recognize that a pure jurisdictional statute such as the sovereign
immunity provision of the FSIA can be the basis of "arising under"
jurisdiction as long as the statute is supported by legitimate Article I
concerns.
This analysis is also the best reading of Osbornand Red Cross.In both
cases, the Court stated-that federal entities could sue and be sued even in
cases governed entirely by state law. The statute at issue in Osborn
authorized the Bank to "sue and be sued, plead and be.impleaded, answer
and be answered, defend and be defended.., in any Circuit Court of the
United States."'' 3 6 The statute authorizing jurisdiction in Red Crossstated
that it could "sue and be sued in courts of law and equity, State or Federal,
within the jurisdiction of the United States. ' 13 7 Both statutes were purely
jurisdictional in that they did not create any new rights or obligations.
The Court upheld jurisdiction in Osborn on the grounds that the
question of the Bank's capacity to sue and be sued would be present (or be
a federal ingredient) in every case and that possibility was enough to
support "arising under" jurisdiction. 38 Part II of this Article already
demonstrated the problems with this overly broad rationale.'39 In Red
Cross,the Court did not repeat the "federal ingredient" theory but instead
simply cited Osborn for the proposition that "Article III's 'arising under'
jurisdiction is broad enough to authorize Congress to confer federal-court
jurisdiction over actions involving federally chartered corporations."14 Of

133. See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121 (1989) (discussed supra notes 108-12 and
accompanying text) (citing Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 496).
134. See Mullinex, supra note 11, at 205.
135. Id.
136. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S (9 Wheat.) 738, 817 (1824).
137. 36 U.S.C. § 300105 (2002).
138. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 823; see also supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
140. Am. Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G. & A.E., 505 U.S. 247, 265 (1992).
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course, that explanation amounts simply to a conclusion, not a reason
supporting federal jurisdiction over a case involving nondiverse parties and
arising exclusively under state law. As demonstrated below, the most
sensible reading of both cases is that Article III authorizes Congress to
enact pure jurisdictional statutes if doing so furthers legitimate Article I
concerns.
At the time of Osborn, the Second National Bank was in serious
trouble. Its branch offices were excluded by two states and seven others
tried to destroy the bank through their tax laws. 4 ' The Bank's leadership
had been criticized both at the state and national levels, its President was
ousted for mismanagement, and its treasurer was ousted for
embezzlement.' 42 The legislature of the State of Ohio officially took the
position that the Court's decision in McCulloch v. Maryland,"3 that states
could not tax the Bank, did not apply to Ohio and should be ignored. 44 In
light of these events, Congress had a substantial Article I reason to vest
jurisdiction over all cases involving the Bank in the federal courts.
Congress's power to create and maintain a National Bank, approved in
McCulloch, must bring with it the power to provide a fair forum for the
Bank's affairs. The jurisdictional provision in Osborndid exactly that, and
there is no good reason why such a provision cannot be a "law" of the
United States4 under which a case can "arise" for purposes of Article III
jurisdiction. " 1
In Red Cross,a person who received a transfusion from the Red Cross
alleged that he received contaminated blood which gave him AIDS. 146 The
Red Cross removed the suit to federal court, and the Supreme Court upheld
jurisdiction with a short citation to Osborn. Professor Weinberg has
suggested a different and better rationale for the Red Crossdecision.
[I]n chartering the Red Cross, Congress means to take
advantage of a cost-effective way of devolving some of the
nation's need to respond to national disasters upon an
independent entity with access to private funds. But to protect

141. See Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 965-66.
142. Id. at 966.
143. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
144. See Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 966.
145. See id. The events surrounding the National Bank at the time of Osborn present a
particularly compelling case for the assertion of "arising under" jurisdiction under a pure
jurisdictional statute. The thesis of this Article, however, does not require such extenuating
circumstances. For example, the mere desire to provide uniform procedures for federal entities
would support the assertion of federal jurisdiction over federally chartered corporations in most
cases.

146. Am. Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G. & A.E., 505 U.S. 247, 249 (1992).
147. Id. at 264.
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the public from the entity's mistakes, and, at the same time, to
protect the entity from local bias, Congress also sees an
interest in giving the Red Cross capacity and furnishing it with
the option of a federal forum.

These identifiable national
interests are what sustain the
148
jurisdiction in Red Cross.
Osborn, Verlinden, and Red Crosscan all be justified on the basis that
Congress had legitimate Article I concerns for vesting jurisdiction in the
federal courts over cases involving the National Bank, the Red Cross, and
foreign countries. Article III's "arising under" provision is best understood
as allowing Congress to use pure jurisdictional statutes to further these
interests. The reasons actually given by the Court in all three cases are not
persuasive. Few judges and scholars accept the idea, as stated in Osborn,
that Congress has authority to provide for federal jurisdiction over any case
where there is even a remote possibility of a federal claim. 149 Similarly, the
mere possibility that there may be a material issue of sovereign immunity
in a case under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the law at issue in
Verlinden, should not justify arising underjurisdiction in every case under
the Act because sometimes sovereign immunity simply will not be at issue.
Additionally, although the Supreme Court was probably correct in Red
Cross that Congress can use federal jurisdiction to protect federal
instrumentalities and federally chartered corporations, it gave no reason for
that conclusion." 0 The reason, however, is obvious: Congress may use pure
jurisdictional statutes to further legitimate Article I concerns, such as the
protection of federal entities. Such statutes constitute "laws of the United
States," under which a federal case can arise.
Applying these cases and principles to the Air Safety Act is illuminating.
Pursuant to Osborn, the Court could hold that there is a remote possibility
of a federal claim in every case under the Act and therefore Article III
jurisdiction is proper. In every case brought under the Act, the Court will
have to determine whether the plaintiff's claim is one that "arises" (as that
term is used in the Act)... from the airplane crashes of September 11,2001,
and this federal question is sufficient to confer "arising under" jurisdiction
over the entire case. This is just another way of saying, however, that the
Court has jurisdiction to decide jurisdiction and then resolve all the

148.
149.
150.
151.

Weinberg, supra note 11, at 801 (italics added).
See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738, 823-24 (1824).
See Red Cross,505 U.S. at 247.
Air Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 408, 115 Stat. 230 (2001).
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substantive claims in the case, even if no federal issue is ever raised. A
better and more persuasive rationale is that Congress has legitimate Article
I reasons for wanting claims arising out of the attacks of September 11 to
be tried in federal court and has passed a law to that effect, and even
though the law is purely jurisdictional, it is a "law of the United States,"
under which a federal claim can arise.
IV. FEDERALISM CONCERNS

Courts and commentators have been reluctant to embrace an
interpretation of Article III that allows Congress to use pure jurisdictional
statutes to confer "arising under" jurisdiction because they are concerned
about federalism values.' 52 Absent the unique case of diversity jurisdiction,
federal courts do not usually resolve issues arising under state law. For
example, when the Supreme Court hears a case with both federal and state
law questions, it only reviews the federal issues.153 There is little debate that
"a deeply rooted premise" of our constitutional system is that "the bulk of
state business remain[s] with the state courts."' 54
When Congress allows federal courts to interpret and then fashion state
law, it arguably interferes with the development ofstate law by state courts.
This in turn affects the ability of state citizens to influence the development
of state law by the election or appointment of state judges.'55 Professor
Goldberg-Ambrose stated with great clarity the federalism issues present
when Congress allows federal courts to interpret state law pursuant to pure
jurisdictional statutes:
Although state legislation may be enacted or amended in order
to influence federal courts' interpretations of state laws,
federal courts exercising protective jurisdiction may interpret
and apply the new legislation in a way contrary to state
citizens' wishes. Further, this legislative recourse for state
citizens can only affect future federal court decisions; prior
federal court judgments will remain and may have far-reaching
consequences. Finally, it may be difficult to enact any
legislation that will anticipate and accommodate the myriad
ways in which federal courts may depart from state court
152. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 469-84 (1957)
dissenting) (arguing that protective jurisdiction invades state sovereignty); Casto,
(Frankfurter, J.,
supra note 11, at 523 (stating that "the general theory of protective jurisdiction is inconsistent
with the traditional view of Article III as a compromise of state and federal interests."); Cross,
supra note 11, at 1223-24 ("If Congress passes ajurisdictional statute that exceeds the bounds of
Article III, it encroaches on the role reserved by the Constitution for the state courts.").
153. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 7, at 603.
154. Rosenberg, supranote 34, at 955.
155. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 7, at 604.
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judges in the interpretation of state law. State citizens may
have to choose between federal courts' distortions of state law
on the one hand and an unsatisfactory alteration of state law
on the other. For example, if protective jurisdiction is
authorized over litigation involving certain energy-related
facilities... state citizens may have to alter the zoning laws as
some impact on
applied to all landowners... in order to have
156
the federal courts' decisions of state law.
When federal courts exercise protective jurisdiction, there is also the
concern that state citizens will be confused about whom to hold
accountable for the development of state law. One of the core ideas of state
citizenship is that people have the right to know who is responsible for
governmental decisions.' Federal interpretations of state law questions
might lead to uncertainty over which government is responsible for which
policies, which could in turn deter citizen participation in governmental
affairs. As Justice Kennedy wrote in a slightly different context,
[t]he theory that two governments accord more liberty than
one requires for its realization two distinct and discernable
lines of political accountability: one between the citizens arid
the Federal Government; the second between the citizens and
the States. If ... the Federal and State Governments are
to . . . hold each other in check by competing for the
affections of the people.., those citizens must have some
means of knowing which of the two governments to hold
accountable for the failure to perform a given function.'
These federalism arguments can be grouped into three general
categories. First, there is a concern that state law questions should
generally be decided by state courts otherwise state law might be distorted
in a manner unwanted by state citizens and their leaders.'59 Second, when
federal courts interpret state law, they interfere with state politics and the
relationship between the people and their elected representatives. 160 Third,
when federal judges decide state law questions, the lines of political
accountability may get blurred, and the people will not know whom to hold
responsible for important political decisions. 16' All of these arguments

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
See id. at 600.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576-77 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 7, at 604.
Id. at 600.
Id.
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recognize that there are important issues of state autonomy that should be
left to the political processes of state and local governments.
The problem with applying these federalism arguments to protective
jurisdiction, however, is that once Congress makes the determination that
a certain issue is one of federal concern, and assuming that Congress has
an enumerated power it could call on to govern that issue, protective
jurisdiction is the least intrusive method ofnational coercion. For example,
when Congress decided that states were paying insufficient attention to the
needs of unions and the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements,
it had several options. It could have completely preempted state law with
federal legislation defining the validity of such agreements; it could have
directed federal judges to make common law governing such agreements; 62
or it could have authorized federal judges to apply state law hoping they
would interpret state statutes sympathetically to collective bargaining
agreements. The first two options deny state legislatures any role to play
in the fashioning of the relevant law.'63 The third option allows for an
interplay between the federal and state systems whereby federal judges have
to look to state sources of authority to fashion the relevant rules.'" If
federal judges reach the wrong result, state legislative action can correct the
mistake.' It is hard to see why an advocate of state autonomy would
prefer the complete exclusion of state authority that comes with options
one and two over the cooperative framework implicit in protective
jurisdiction.'66 As two noted scholars have observed:
[I]nstead of achieving uniformity by imposing its own law,
may not Congress, hoping for harmony and orchestration
through expecting and desiring some continuing diversity,
hand the conductor's baton to the federal courts rather than
giving them a set of cymbals with which to drown out all other
sounds? . . . It would be most regrettable if a federal
constitution forbade the general government to exercise its
regulatory powers in this forbearing, sanguine, and initially

162. This was the option that Congress actually selected, at least according to a majority of
the Supreme Court. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
163. See Cross, supra note 11, at 1223.
164. See id.
165. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 7, at 60g.
166. See Cross, supra note 11, at 1223 (When Congress legislates on a topic or delegates to
the federal courts the power to create common law on the topic, the resulting federal law displaces
state law. Protective jurisdiction, although perhaps imparting a federal flavor to state law, at least
preserves the underlying force of state law and arguably presents a lesser affront to state
legislative authority.); Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 937 ("If a grant of protective jurisdiction is
constitutional, Congress may afford federal jurisdiction without preempting state rules of
decision-a result that tends to minimize congressional intrusions on state interests.").
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perhaps experimental manner which turns to account the
genius of a federal system.' 67
The Air Safety Act demonstrates how protective jurisdiction is more
responsive to state concerns than other legitimate exercises of
congressional power. Under several Article I powers (the Commerce
Clause and the War Power), Congress could preempt state tort law and
create exclusive federal claims for those injured in the airline crashes of
September 11.68 If Congress did so, the unique aspects of New York,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia tort law would be lost under the rubric of a
completely federal scheme. Under the law as written, however, the judges
of the Southern District of New York will have to apply the law of those
jurisdictions, and there is no reason to believe they will not do so in good
faith. After all, that is the task federal judges perform routinely in diversity
cases. The net result is a system where state concerns as expressed through
their substantive law are maintained and the federal goal of uniformity of
procedure that Congress obviously desired is furthered with as little
disruption of state processes as possible. '69 It may be that the states would
prefer to try these claims in their own courts under their own laws, but the
Federal Constitution takes that right away from them under the Supremacy
Clause and Congress's enumerated powers.'7 That being the case, certainly
the states would prefer a system where their own law remains viable over
one where their substantive choices become completely irrelevant.
The second federalism objection to protective jurisdiction is that it
interferes with the ability of state citizens to influence the development of
state law by the election or appointment of state judges."' This concern is
not related to political accountability but rather to the substantive desire
that state citizens and state judges create state law. Again, however, as
applied to protective jurisdiction, states are better off with federal judges
interpreting state law and giving it force rather than Congress preempting
state law entirely and replacing it with federal standards. Although state
judges may no longer be able to influence the development of the particular

167. AlexanderBickel &HarryWellington, LegislativePurposeandthe JudicialProcess:The
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1957), quotedin Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note
7, at 590.
168. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl.3, 11.
169. Many jurisdictions also have certification procedures whereby federal courts can ask
state supreme courts to answer difficult legal questions arising under state law. This beneficial
mechanism is unavailable if federal judges have to apply either federal statutory standards or
common law.
170. See Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 937 n.29 ("[I]n most every (if not every) instance in
which Congress may confer protective jurisdiction, Congress may also preempt state law
altogether.").
171. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 7, at 604.
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body of law under consideration (assuming the federal statute, like the Air
Safety Act, is exclusive), at least state legislatures can provide clear
direction to federal judges if there is enough political will to do so.
The third federalism objection to protective jurisdiction is that the
political accountability of both governments is diminished when federal
judges are required to apply state standards to resolve disputes. Although
federal judges routinely perform this task when exercising diversity
jurisdiction, most people understand the benefits of having arguably neutral
judges resolving cases between citizens of different states. When federal
judges exercise coercive power over citizens of the same state under state
standards, however, there is a possibility that citizens of that state will be
unsure whom to hold responsible for that coercion."
This argument, like many of the political accountability arguments
advanced by the Rehnquist Court in cases like New Yorkv. UnitedStates,73
and Printz v. United States,74 ignores the reality that state officials are
quite capable of explaining to their constituencies when federal law requires
them to effectuate specific policies. As Justice Stevens has argued, "to the
extent that [federally required] action proves politically unpopular, we may
be confident that elected officials charged with implementing it will be quite
clear to their constituents where the source of the misfortune lies."' 75
In addition, it seems unlikely that state judges will be held accountable
for the decisions of federal judges. State judges routinely make decisions
under federal law, and few argue that political accountability is threatened
by this necessary consequence of the Supremacy Clause. 176 Furthermore,
if Congress is prohibited from using protective jurisdiction to further
Article I interests, it may instead authorize federal judges to create federal
common law which will bind state actors. The development of federal
common law would have a more disruptive effect on state political
processes and would lead to greater confusion about political accountability
than the exercise of protectivejurisdiction, where at least the source of the
underlying law is identifiable and changeable.
Another federalism argument that judges and scholars advance to limit
the doctrine of protective jurisdiction is that if Congress is allowed to
authorize federal courts to hear any case involving an activity that Congress
could regulate under its enumerated powers, Congress could vest
jurisdiction in the federal courts over virtually every contract or tort that

172. Id. at 600-01.
173. 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (holding that Congress may not commandeer state
legislatures).
174. 521 U.S. 898,924 (1997) (holding that Congress may not commandeer state executive

officials).
175. Id. at 958 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176. See Galligan, supra note 11, at 53.
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substantially affects interstate commerce and completely emasculate state
court jurisdiction. 1" Because of this concern, numerous scholars who are
in favor of protective jurisdiction have suggested limiting Congress's
authority in various ways. For example, Professor Goldberg-Ambrose
suggests a balancing test whereby "state interests in maintaining control
over state law should be balanced against federal interests in avoiding
unfairness to individuals and in overseeing state laws." ' And, Professor
Mishkin, one of the earliest advocates of protective jurisdiction, would
allow a pure jurisdictional statute only if it furthers "an articulated and
active federal policy regulating a field. 179 Others have advanced other
limitations that would allow Congress to use protectivejurisdiction in only
specific circumstances such as when it establishes a rule that will also be
employed in state courts' or only when the jurisdictional statute furthers
a "substantial governmental interest" and is "narrowly tailored" to further
that interest.' All of these tests and limitations are advanced in order to
mitigate the allegedly harsh effects on state autonomy that would result if
Congress were allowed to enact any jurisdictional statute that furthers an
Article I concern.
The advocates of these balancing tests and limitations fail to answer
numerous important questions. First, how do courts distinguish
"substantial" federal interests from "non-substantial" ones or decide which
jurisdictional statutes take too much "control over state law" away from the
states and which leave enough control to satisfy the federal standard." 2
Although these kinds of criticisms can be leveled at most balancing tests,
the concern that Congress may require every lawsuit involving an interstate
contract or tort to be filed in federal court does not seem like the kind of
risk that should prompt such intrusive judicial interference into Congress's
power to vest jurisdiction in the federal courts to further legitimate Article
I concerns.
Second, the proponents of these balancing tests in the name of
federalism also fail to acknowledge that there is at present the risk that
Congress will federalize the law of interstate torts or contracts, or allow
federal courts to create federal common law for all interstate torts or
contracts. This concern, however, does not lead to the imposition of
177. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,474 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("For example, every contract or tort arising out of a contract affecting commerce
might be a potential cause of action in the federal courts, even though only state law was involved
in the decision of the case."); see also Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 955 n.1 11.
178. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 7, at 615-16.
179. Mishkin, supranote 11, at 192.
180. See SandraSlack Glover, CommentArticlelllandtheWest/allAct: IdentifyingFederal
Ingredients, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 925, 951 (1977).
181. See Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 1024.
182. See Galligan, supra note 11, at 54.
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1 3
balancing tests when Congress regulates commerce among the states. 1
Perhaps, the Court should interpret the Commerce Clause more narrowly,
but doing so would concurrently limit Congressional power to further the
Commerce Clause through pure jurisdictional statutes. In other words, to
the extent there is a strong federalism interest at stake here, it is in the
interpretation of the specific enumerated power Congress is relying on to
support apurejurisdictional statute. Ifthat power is properly implemented,
then the use of protective jurisdiction as a means of furthering that power
is less intrusive than other means Congress has at its disposal to enforce
national policy on the states.
One scholar has suggested that protective jurisdiction, which he finds
constitutionally problematic, is unnecessary because Congress has other
means at its disposal, that is, creating federal common law, to achieve the
same results.18 4 The problem with this argument is that Congress may not
want to impose national substantive standards onthe entire nation. Uniform
federal standards might not be as sensitive to unique local complexities as
the laws of the various states."8 5 In addition, creating new duties and
obligations in a well established area ofthe law might be expensive and not
provide adequate warnings to potential defendants of the appropriateness
of their conduct."8 6 And, if a particular area of the law is controversial,
Congress might not want federal judges to step into the substantive fray
and articulate new national goals and priorities.8 7 Despite these
reservations, however, Congress still might have substantial reasons for
vesting jurisdiction in the federal courts over aparticular category of cases.
For example, Congress might have wanted the cases arising out of the
September 11 attacks to be tried in one particular federal court for security
reasons or to have the airlines and their insurers litigate the claims in one
place for national economic reasons. Another possible rationale for the law
is that Congress wanted federal judges to oversee the flow of information,
some of which might involve foreign policy concerns. Congress should be
allowed to further these legitimate Article I interests without, at the same
time, having to displace the substantive tort standards of New York,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Certainly, federalism is furthered in this instance
by the use of protective jurisdiction rather than federal common law.
A final argument against the constitutionality of pure jurisdictional
statutes is that Congress may be able to pass such laws without serious
political risk, but Congress would have a harder time actually preempting

183. See id.
184. See Cross, supra note 11, at 1221 ("The well-developed theory of federal common law
can address all the concerns expressed by the proponents of protective jurisdiction.").
185. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 7, at 576.
186. See id. at 577.
187. See id. at 578.
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large areas of state substantive law, and therefore Congress could
effectuate a wholesale transfer ofjurisdiction from state courts to federal
courts without significant disadvantage if pure jurisdictional statutes satisfy
Article III. 18 There are three responses to this concern. First, the
assumption that Congress could effectuate such a transfer without political
argument from the states is questionable. Certainly, it is hard to imagine a
law such as the Uniform Interstate Tort and Contract Jurisdictional Act
sailing through the Congress without significant opposition from those in
favor of state autonomy. Second, Congress has never passed such a law,
and the Supreme Court has said that the potential for abuse of a power is
not an argument against the exercise ofthat power.8 9 Finally, there appears
to be no coherent middle ground when it comes to the validity of pure
jurisdictional statutes that are rationally related to Congress's enumerated
powers. They are either constitutional or not. Most would agree, however,
that there are times when important Article I concerns justify such statutes
(such as with the Air Safety Act). As a predictive matter it is almost
impossible to imagine the Court striking down the law. As between giving
this power to Congress in all circumstances or in no circumstances, the
latter seems preferable in light of the fact that the perfectly constitutional
alternatives to pure jurisdictional statutes completely take away state
substantive choices and transfer them to either the Congress or the federal
courts.
There is one, and only one, appropriate limitation on Congress's
discretion to use pure jurisdictional statutes under Article III: the law must
further a legitimate Article I interest or other enumerated power. The
history and text of Article III demonstrate that the use of federal
jurisdiction was always intended to be instrumental. Whether federal courts
were to referee disputes between citizens of different states, promote the
uniformity and supremacy offederal law, or govern controversies involving
foreign ambassadors, jurisdiction was a means to an end, not an end in and
of itself.
If Congress believes that one of its enumerated powers will be advanced
by federal jurisdiction, it may place cases involving that power in federal
court. Like all exercises of congressional power, that decision is subject to
review. There is no reason, however, to subject that congressional decision
to anything more than a deferential rational basis test. The only real interest
we, as a people, have in limiting Congress's use of protective jurisdiction
is to make sure that Congress is not allowed to take a truly state law case,
one that Congress could not affect under its enumerated powers, and
transfer it to federal court. That interest can be fully protected by making
188. I thank my colleague Kelly Timmons for raising this concern.
189. See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 363 (1903) ("The possible abuse of a power is
not an argument against its existence.").
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sure that pure jurisdictional statutes are rationally related to legitimate
Article I concerns.
V. CONCLUSION

In enacting the Air Safety Act, Congress had a legitimate Article I
interest in creating exclusive federal jurisdiction. Had it wanted to do so,
Congress could have preempted state tort law and either created federal
standards of liability or directed the federal courts to create federal
common law. Instead, Congress chose to maintain the authority of state law
over these tragic events while at the same time using federal judges to
achieve efficiency, uniformity, and fairness. The statute creating federal
jurisdiction is a "law" of the United States under which an Article III claim
can "arise." There is no legitimate textual, historical, or federalism
argument why this grant of jurisdiction should be invalidated by the
Supreme Court.
These principles transcend the specific example of the Air Safety Act.
A pure jurisdictional statute that furthers a legitimate Article I concern is
properly a "law" under which a claim may arise. Any federalism objections
to this rule should be directed at Congress's Article I powers not its
authority to grant jurisdiction under Article III.
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